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'title:

Inter-Bureau Power Relations:

A Sociological Analysis of an

Ideal Type Organizational Modsl

APPROV£!:}),BY ME:..I1HEkS OF 'lHE l'HES IS

Cor1..~ITTEE:

The research problem of this the.s:!.s is an
bureau powet' relations.

ex:a.'!lin~tion

A utodification of Hax Weber's classical ideal

type bureauct'acy is the ::::on.ceptual model to which
is made.

An

e&rpiri~al

of inter-

socioiog~j

cal analysis

examinati.on of the: variance between the con

ceptual macel a.nd data collected ir the field is analyzed in order
(.llustrate inter-bureau power 'relations.

model is based upon three a::;S!?:r-t:i::ms.

1:,;0

The. analysis of tht> conceptual

'l'hi?Y <lre:

(1) inter-bureau

pO\o,rer relations are based upon coercion and not cooperation; (2) nortn
ative standards that are established by t.he administrators of the
bureauc.rac.y are differe:nt.lally

(~n£orced;

and O) goals thRt

ar(~

er, t2.blisli;::d

by the administrators of the bureaucracy are subject to distortion.
Participant-observatiou and casual interviewing techniques wer.e
the methods employed to coll('ct data. pertaining to the nature of inter
bureau power relations over

II

nine month period.

The research problem

lent itself to a qualitative approach in that the data were largely
subjective and required recol:JinS over a period of time.

The data

collected were primarily a result of participant-observation conducted
w(lile an

~mploY~1! of.

the oun'llucracy studied.

Additional information

was collected and analyzed from documents related to the functioning
of the bureaucracy_

Permission was sought and received, from the

bureaucra.cy and related organ tzations studied, to use the data col
lected.
This study found that the Weberian styled conceptual model,
representing the authority hierarchy of the bureaucracy studied, was
theoretically based upon GOop{:ration, rationality, logic and equf..li
tartan principles.

Maintaining the Weber ian styled authority hier

archy·had become ideology to the administrators of the bureaucracy.
The existence and operation oC this particular hierarchy was made a
matter of publi.c record, thufi satisfying the political aspects of public
accountability.

However, it was found that there were other

o~gani

zational hierarchies that the administr.ators of the bureaucracy utilized
in performing the operational functions of the bureaucracy.

For the

pt1"rposes of this thesis the "otherH authority hierarchies were known as
working models.

The authority hierarchies of the working models seems

to be operat:i.onally based upon the concepts of coercion, differential
enforcement of norllV::t tive s tandl.lrds, and distortion of administrators'

3

goels.

A unique cheUlcteristic of tht.: v10rking

:nod~ls ",-1<•. 8

that they

were quasi-secret t and virtually no public records were kept of their
existence of operation.
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CHAPTER I
A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to critically examine inter-bureau
power relations of a specific bureaucracy.l

(Inter-bureau power rela

tions mfers to the relationship maintained between bureaus} that form
a single bureaucracy on the basis of super and subordination).

A refine

ment of Max Weber's classical presentation of the ideE.l type is created
in order to establish a conceptual frame of reference
This fra"lIla of reference is designated the
(see Faris, 1966:980
analysis).

This

011

~odel

fo~

this study.

IIWeberian ideal type model"

the use of cOllceptu::!l models in sociological

provides the conceptual structure for analysis

of organizational inter-bureau pOYier relations.

Initially, four asser

tions are discussed in a critical analysis of the modified Weberian
ideal type model (a discussion of this model is contained in Chapter II).
This discussion is followed by an empirical examination of an actual
bureau in an attempt to illustrate the variance betwee.n the Weber ian
model and the empirical example.

The findings of this examination are

presented in a subsequent chapter.
~{ethodology

For the purposes of this study the term bureaucracy, or coreplex

1.

Terms are defined below.
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organizaticn, refers to

all

administrative structure composed of separate

agencies or bureaus which are managed by sets of officials on a super
and subordination basis.

Within a bureaucracy the term bureau denotes

a component agency that has a fixed position on a hierarchical scale
that is managed by its own set of officials; a subdivision of a bureau
cracy.
With the title of "Assistant Director for Citizen Pa.rticipation"l
for the McCannville Development Commission (MDC) 1 , I was afforded a
"ring side seat" in the observation and participation of the exercise
of formal and informal power in the citizen participation realm of
urban renewal.

As an employee of the MDC, my duties included the

receiving and understanding of the formal public goals of the Commission
and the proposed formal method of achieving goals.

I found that while

formally claiming an organizational structure that I have designa.ted
the Weber ian ideal type model, tha orga.nizatiori was forced to informally
modify its formal authority hierarchy to achieve its formal goals
(Becker, 1970:14).
I found that the participant--obser:vation and casual interviewing
techniques have several dr&wbacks.

Primarily, data were collected in

a nonstandardized we.y, thus taaking statist:ica1 type treatment and
analysis of information very difficult (Doby: 1954).

Consequently, I

had to depend on a more impressionistic interpretation of some of the
data in order to make generalizations, thus potentially allowing bias
to change the impression of emerging data (Doby , 1959).

1.

Fictitious

n,"lme.

In reference

3

to the participant-observation method, Eugene Webb,

~

in his, Unobtrusive Measures, suggested that,

• no matter how well

It

a1.) (1966:113)

integrated an observer becorees we feel he is still an element of
potential bias. 1I

se1ect~·

Thus, Webb's position was that an "observer may

ively expose himself to data, or selectively perceive it •

1\

Asa

researcher utilizing the p.!:.rticipant-observer techtlique, I felt Webb's
point was well taken.

The greatest area for bias in this study is "ihat

M. W. Riley (Fari$, 1966:l0Cl) referred to as Htbe limitation to a
specific role. 1I

As the "Assistant Director for Citizen Participation tt

for the MDC I was confined to a specific role, and it was from that role
that most of the data for this thesis were collected.

In an attempt

to "counter-act ll bias, informants were used to supply additional inform
ation and to confirm previously held notions, thereby acting as a check
on potential distortions (Deans 1954).

Informants were used throughout

this study, via the casual interview technique.

Also; documents,

minutes of meetings, memorandums, letters, etc., were collected
basis of their pertinence to the study.

011

the

Thus, a check system was devel

oped to curb the effects of bias in interpretation of data.

The parti

cipant-observation portion of this study was conducted over a nine month
period, February,1970, through September,1970.
The

theo~etical

perspectives for the interpretation of thp. dala

were primurily a result of a libra.ry search.

The books and periodicals

listed in the selected bibliography were chosen because of their seeming
pertinence to the problem.
Permission w'as sought and received from the bureaus and organizations
involved in this study to use data collected from them.

4
'Ebe Problem

rne administrators of some formal organizations appear to have
adopted a form of administrative hierarchy that can be conceptualized
as a modification of Weber's ide.al type bureaucracy.

The formal organ

ization of some of these bureaucracies seem to follow Weber's descrip
tion of an authority hierarchy, based upon super and subordinate rela
tionships.
is

I assert that the reality of inter-bureau power relations

somewhat different.
My first assertion :i.s that coercion, not Weber's conce.pt of cooper

ation. serves to integrate bureaucratic elements that
processes of a bureaucracy (Etzioni, 1961b).

for~

the functional

This is demonstrated by

an authority hierarchy based upon super and subordinate relationships
of one bureau (in a chain of bureaus or within a bureaucracy) to another.
Rules, IIfilest!, laws and regulations, etc., are. not established to in
sure efficiency of goal attainment

~

=, but are est3.blished as rigid

boundaries and strong coercive measures to prevent the exerclse of power
and decision making at certain bureaucratic levels.

Thus, rules, laws

and regulations provide a sanctioning base for those individuals not
performing to predetermined expectations.

Further, employee ratings

and recommendations for promotions are not in reality based upon job
knowledge or particular skill, but based upon the employee's ability
and willingness to "play-the-game," and as a method to coerce those not
overtly "cooperating" to so do,

The role of these mechanisms is not

indicative of v()luntary or cooperative integrati.on of bureaucratic
elements, but a

c1e~onstration

of the

exp~ctation

that employees may not

cooperatf:. an.d thereby require rigid control.
My second assertion is that the normative standards established
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by the aduinistration of a Dureaucrbcy
wi thin bureaus of a giYen bureaucracy.

ar~

differentially enforced

By \vay of illustration, the

administration of bureau D (the lowest level bureau in a four level
bureaucracy) may be expected to perio'em certai::l. established duties
regularly by the administration of bureau A (the highest administrative
bureau in the bureaucracy), while the directors of bureau A might require
another of its subordinate bureaus to take only cursory notice of the
same required duties.

Thus, the

exist~nce

of uniform normative standards

throughout the bureaucracy allows bureau A,
via arbitrary use of sanc
,
-
tioning power, to control its subordinate bureaus.

The administrators

of subordinate bureaus may violate certain standards with the knowledge
of the director of bureau A, but the leaders of bureau A retain the
optional ability to apply sanctions to their subordinate bureaus for
those violations.

Thus, the directors of bureau A by arbitrary use of

authority over their subordinate bureaus greatly disrupt
hierarchy of A to B to C to D.

the authority

This practice is continued on the

bureau level as well by the supervisors of individual bureaus.
My third assertion is that goals established by the directors
of bureau

A

are subject to distortion and manipulation while being

"passed down" through the various administrations of subordinate
bureaus, while the communication relating to the achievement of the
goals tends to support the original goals intent, as the report of
accomplishment passes back up the chain of bureaus to the directors
of bureau A.

Thus the administrators of bureau A tend to believe that

much of the origir.a.l goal has been achieved; the "boss gets what he
wants to hear."

CHAPTER II

REVIE(-l OF THE I.ITERATURE

Weber's

Classic Bureaucratic Model

Weber's theoretical analysis of the ideal type bureaucratic struc
ture has been critic1Zed by some contempor<"ry sociologists (lJahrendorf,
1959; Thompson, 1961; Udy, 1959) for only examining its

formal char

acteristics and ignoring the modifications that occur in actual practice.
My purpose here is not to add still more criticism of the Weberian
bureaucratic model, but to illustrate Weber's ideal model as it pertains
to inter-bureaucratic power relations and specifically that part of the
Weber ian model which relates to the authority hierarchy.

The relation·'

ship of 'Heber's ideal structure to actual working models will be d1s
cussed in the following sections of this paper.
Victor Thompson (1961:12) suggests that Weber equates the devel
opment of modern bureaucracy to the evolution of society; that is,
modern organizations have evolved from earlier ferms by incorporating
advancing specialization:
In an earlier period organizations could depend much more on
the "line of command." The superior could tell others what to
do because he could master the knowledge and techniques neces
sary to do so intelligently. As science and technology devel
oped, the supervisor lost to experts the ability to comnand in
one field after another, but retained the right as part of the
role.
Technology 1 combined 'Ni th the ever increasing complexity of admin
istration, has greatly modified the supervisor's role.

He has maintained

7

his power and authority through his

u office,1I

but has been fcrced to

rely on specialized staffs or experts for technical knowledge and pco
blelll solving strategy.

(The term "office," in this case, may be defined

as a designated position within a bureiiu or bureaucracy that is highly
defined in terms of duties ana responsibilities, and is located on a
vertical scale of super and subordination.)
are well marked in modern

bureaucracies~

decision from the ability to do so.
maintain~d

Defined areas of authority

dividing the right to make a

Thus the authority hierarchy is

ana relationships of super and subordination are perpetuated.

Crucial to Weber's position is that authority, repre:senting the right
to issue orders and expect them to be obeyed, is inherent in the office
(Peabody, 1964).

The office, by its strategic plac'ement and desig

nation within a bureau or bureaucracy, represents power and authority
that is inherent in the structure of the organization, thus in Weberian
terms, it is definable as formal, rational and impersonal.
Peter Blau (1955:226) offers a useful differentiation between
power and authority:
The distinctive feature of authority is that normative con
straints affect conlpliance with directives. The fact that a
person compels others to do his bidding by employing coercion
or sanctions or threats is prima facia evidence that he does
not have authority over thea in respect to the conduct he
seeks to bring about.
Individuals occupy the office and consequently wield the power of that
office.

The amount of power and authority then

is regulated by the

position that the office occupies within the bureaucratic hierarchy.
The officehol.der is appointed by a superior within the organization to
hold a specific office.
tenure, ability

<lIul

This appointment is theoretically based upon

lLerit.

Thus, qualit:i.es of charisma and leadership
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tend to playa secol'ldary role in the selection of a new officeholder.
Weber (1968:956) states that:
Although managerial fdp-01ogy still strongly contains the char
ismatic image, bureaucratic organ.izations seek to nvo:l.d dependence
upon individuals by reducing relevant information to classes, and
organizational activity to routines which are activated when the
apprupriate class of information is perceived.
Consequently, with the advance of specialization a greater stress
on departmentalization and routinization of work activity has been
created.

The structure of a bureaucracy is manifested as a department

alization of offices within a hierarchy in which each office has a
place in a table or organization, a vertical hierarchical position in
which the office is subordinate to another office(s).

This placement

of individuals within offices of the formally categorized structure
becomes what \veber (1968) calls "the prillciple of official jurisdict:tonal
areas," which is generally ordered by rules, laws and administrative
regulations.

The bureau, within a bureaucracy, is highly departmenta1

ized, with each individual occupying a specific designated position
within a department or unit.
assigned, designated authority

For each position there are official duties
1ines~

and methodical provision established

for carrying out rules and regulations (Weber, 1968).

The formality of

this system is manifested by a means of a more or less complicated social
ritual which by its nature symbolizes and supports the "pecking order" of
various offices (Etzioni, 1961:47).
Such formality, which is integrated 't"ith the distribution of
authority within the system, serves to minimize friction by
largely restricting (official) contact to modes which are pre
viously defined by the rules of the organization.
Thus the Heberian principle of office hierarchy and the channe1
ization of cOllUUunication ,.;ithi.n it, clearly establishes a syste.m of
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super and subordination.
is a highly controlled and

The methodology of inter-bureau communicatiol.1.
regul~rized

phenomenon.

With established

rules, laws and regulations routinizing and categorizing communication
the hierarchical structure is reinforced, as options and decisions of
individuals become sanctionable for noncompliance with established
procedures.

This sanctioning process is based in part upon written

documents (the "files") which are preserved in their original form and
provide a managerial base.

1:nese documents provide a focal poim; for

the exercise of authority by supervisors within a bureau.

That is,

"the files" provide regularized guidelines for office procedure, and a
nonpersonalized base for sanctioning deviancy from the established
routines.

A supervisor has the option of saying, "it's nothing personal,

but you know the rules."

The supervisor is only supporting the estab

lished system of laws and regulations and is somewhat protected by the
formal appearance of objectivity in this decision making process, an
appearance formulated by this IIscreening" fUl1.:tion of bU1'E'aucratic rules
(Gouldner, 1954:163).
Weber IS ide.al bureaucracy is elaborated in Figure 1.
arrows represent lines of authority

011

The solid

a supe.rordinate basis--while

broken arrows represent the channels of conmunication.
Bureaucracy XY

1.8

represented. by four aeparate bureaus in a

relationship of super and subordination.

Truit is, bureau A is super

ordinate to bureaus B, C, and D; while B is subordinate to A, it is
superordinate to C and D, and so on, leaving bureau D subordinate to
a.ll and superordinate to none.

Formal comLlunication between the bureaus

follotis the authority hierarchy, thus pe.rformin.g both hierarchy reinfol"dng

10

FIGURK I

WEBER'S IDEAL TYPE BURE}.UCRACY

Bureaucracy XY

11
and boundary maint.ananc(;;: functions.
Maintenance of the hierarchy is accomplished through the estab
lishruent of la\"s, "(ules and r-egulations.

Bureau A, the head agency,

maintains the superior position in the realm of inter-bureaucratic
power relations in which it has overriding authority over subordinate
bureaus.

However, bureau B, while subordinate to A's dictums, also

may require bures.us C and D to comply with its standards and "(ules,
and C likewise in relation to D.

D remains subordinate to bureaus A,

Band C and consequently is obliged to comply with their requirements.
Thus, while subordinate bureaus may not disregard or veto regulations
established by superordinate bureaus, they may add additional require
ments or regulations for subordinate bureaus and expect compliance.
Once it is fully established, a bureaucracy is among the social
institutions which are the hardest to change.

Bureaucracy has developed

as an effective instrument for institutionalizing power relationships.
Consequently, a system of rationally organized reasons stands behind
every act of a bureaucratic administration.

The more the bureaucracy

is "dehumanized" (or the more Ifrational"), the more it succeeds in
eliminating from official business, love, hatred, and all purely person
aI, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation.

In

Weberian terms, this is the specific nature of bureaucracy, and its

A Critical Analvsis
,
The Role of COf.,rcinn in Inter-Bureau Power Relations.
the description of r.ha Weber ian authoritarian hierarchy

i~

Crucial to
the assumption

that compliaace is based upon cultul.'al 'Iahles, societal norms,
stional

roles (•..J....ish~~.
,,- .. , 1970).
-

~·md

mh
J. ere.f ore: th
.e system 0 f super and

associ

12
subordination is viewed as legitimate in the minds of the organization's
actors in light of the societal socialization process.

Consequently,

in theory, the actors wi thin a bureaucracy spontaneously and will:i.ngly
"obey those authorities :tn which they can sense,

h~wever

subconsciously, their legitimacy!! (Nisbi't, 1970:140).

dimly, even

Here the argu

ment becomes somewhat circular in that authority is made legitimate
"by the mores, by all the customs aud folkways with which authority is
conunonly surrounded" (N isbit, 1970: 140) •

In short, Weber posits that

bureaucratic systems are systems that assume cooperation and integration
of their composite elements, rather than the c,oercion of them.
Upon examination of inter-bureau power relations, both theoretically
and analytically, I found that the formal or public presentation of a
bureaucracy generally followed the Weberian model.

Organizational and

manpower charts nominally supported the Weber ian theory to near per
fection, while designs of communication systems formally support and
illustrate the super and subordinate channels of authority_
rules, regulation and the IIfi1es ll are additional . . T
. itten

Laws,

e~li,dence

of

the applicability of the Weberian model.
My revie,,, of the mechanisms through which bureaucratic authority
is exercised however; demonstrates an informal system of coercion and
blatant authoritarianism that is far more influential in inter-bureau
cratic power relationships than in \\feber' s formal model.
The nature of bureaucracy itself is based upon the concept not
of cooperation, but of coercion, in that a hierarchy of authority is
established in order to 'have maximum control ove.r subordinates.

Con

sequently, "bureaucratic authority is based not on devotion to the

13

SlJpervj.Bor or respect for him as a person, but on an adaptation neces
sitated by his power (Blau, 1955:226)."
Wi-th these concepts in mind, one becomes aware of the conservative
nature of bureaucracies.
designed to achieve

The authod.ty hierarchy is not necessarily

ecals~ '!:Il.lt

instead serves the function of pun

ishing Lhose iadividuals failing to ".omply with established procedures.
Tnus, it would seem that bureaucracy is not generally designed for
achievement or goal attainment, out for (he prevention of failure of
the bureaucratic system.
The advancement chance of officials and even their chances
to keep their civil service jobs depend on the rating they
periodically receive from their supervisor. Such an imper
sonal dependency creates anxieties and frustrations for most
adults, and thus the need for adaptation (Blau,,1955:2l9).
Thus, what would overtly appear to be voluntary obedience to the
supervisor, is in reality instigated through coercion (job security).
The subord inates' conCertL with his supervisor's opinion provides the
supervisor with informal sanctions, since supervisory praise or blame
becomes significant for every member of the group.

Additionally, the

supervisory practice of rewards and punishments for subordinates demon
strates that the supervisor does not expect unconditional obedience of
his directives.

A system of reyTards and punishments within such a

highly organized institution is clearly an example of the coercive
nature of the supervisory aspect of bureaucracy,

because one generally

can only be "rewarded" for compliance with organizational directives
established by the bureaucratic officials.

Reward is achieved through

maximum compliance--while punishment tends to be i.ll\lstrative of failure
to comply witt organizational directives.
A further illustration of the

negativ~

and coercive nature of

bure.aucracy wa.s reported by

ThotlJ~son

(1961:15):

Hierarchical relations overempha.size the veto and under
emphasize approval of innovation. Since there is no appeal
from the supervisor's decision, a veto usually ends the matter.
However, an approval will often go to the next higher level
where it is again subject to veto.
The consequence cf this particular authoritarian mentality is
the suppression of innovation and de...· iancy and the promotion of "statuti
quoism. H
The following Ibt of tactics available to supervisors as control
devices is adapted from Downs

(1966:l44)~

1.

The creation, development and implementation of rules and
regulation. This has the ffect of reducing discretionary
decision making by subordinates.

2.

"Development of distortion proof message coc.ies for instruc
tion." This reduces the subordinate option of saying, "I
didn't understand what I was supposed. to do."

3.

"Development of objective measures of performance."
"Checking out proposed dil'ectives in adva.nce with subordin
ates to insure that no extraordinary resistance will occur."

·4.

The first three of these measures are designed to reduce

subordin~

ates discretionary powers, hence instilling rigidity into the organi
zation.
A further method of control is tte
reports of

tra~sactions

requirem,~nt

of keeping written

and performances, which provide

a means of exerting control over their subordinates.

sup~rvisors

'These

re~orts

three major purposes:
1.

They infol:ID high-level officials about what is happening
in the lewer J.evels of the bure%lucracy.

2.

The necessity of preparing periodic reports serves to re
mind each subordinate that he must meet certain standards
of performance.

3.

The fear. of punishment for failure to meet those standards

with
have
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encourages him to carry ou.t desired performances or at
least report having done so (Downs, 1966:144).
The third point is perhaps the most crit:f.ca1 one for the pur
poses of this paper-- lI the fear. of punishment for failure to meet

t~ose

standards n is clearly indicative of the coercive nature of the bureau
cratic hierarchy.

The subordinate is not willingly complying to a

supervisor's directive; he may be coerced into doing so by the threat of
sanctions.

As B1au (1955) suggestR, the ultimate source of burcau

cratic authority is the official power of sanction, externally bestowed.
One of the most widespread and complex devices employed by a
bureaucracy

to control subordinate agencies is separate monitoring

organizations.
The purpose of the external monitoring service is to determine the
extent to which compliance to established procedures is being maintained.
Thus, the monitoring service is another mechanism for the maintenance
of the status quo nature of the bureaucracy by the discovering and
reporting areas of noncompliance, thereby providing still another
basl.s for issuing sanctions.
Bureaucratic rules are particularly illustrative of the coercive
nature of bureaucratic hierarchies.

Rules comprise a functional equi

valent for direct, personally given orders.

Like direct orders, rules

specify the obligation of the ,..orker; hence, rules serve to narrow the
subordinates area of discretion.

Subordinate's. have fewer options con

cerning what they mayor may not do, and the area of "privilege n is
crowded out by the growing area of

lI

ob1igation't (Gou1dner, 1954:163).

The public nature of rules enables deviancy to be detected by any super
visor, thus enlarging the informatior.al channels open to the heads of
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bureaus and in turn enabling them to keep thei.:r. own subordinates in
line (Gouldner, 1954:163).
the
ther..

frame~ork

of these

Official sanctions normally occur w:i.thin

pre-e~istin8

rules vf the organization.

form both a potential sanctioning base for

~upervisors

Rules,

and also

represent boundaries of obligatory behavior.
What has been discussed to this point is the reality of bureau
cratic power relations.

Of some sociological significance is the degree

of divergence between the formal public presentation of the bureau
cratic power structure compared to the informal or real nature of the
organization.

In the public presentation of its organizational struc

ture, the bureaucracy appears to be rational, equalitarian, and just,
with its authority hierarchy established as being both legitimate and
humane.

Efforts are instigated by "top-level" management to promote

this image both internally and externally.

Continual propagandize

ment of the ideal model to the actors within the bureaucracy and to the
society at large performs the function of making any deviancy from the
ideal model seem to be only a local or isolated problem, and therefore,
not ubiquitous to the system itself.

However, an examination of the

mechanisms by which a bureaucracy operates has revealed a rigidly
authoritarian and coercive structure.

Its nature relies on power

relations rather than cooperation for its functioning; consequently a
bureaucracy is oriented towards "status quo.:i.sm" rather than achievement
and innovation.
Differential Enforcement of
enforc~ment

~ules

and Regulations.

Differential

of rules and regulations will be discussed on both the inter

bureaucratic a::,o. bUrf:.3'-lCratic level.:;.
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l{ormclti"vc standards, al'; manHested through organizational r.ules
and regulations, may receive differential enforcement between the
bureaus of a single bureaucracy.

That is, action agency D, at the

bottoT'l of the model (see Figure I, p. 13), might be expected to perform
certain universally required duties by At the lIhead" bureau, while A
might require subordinate bureau B only to take cursory notice.

The

existence of normative standards allows A to control, via sanctioning
power, its subordinate bureaus.

Bureaus B, C and D may violate certain

staudards with the knowledge of A, but A retains the optional ability
to sanction its subordinate bureaus for those violations (Blau, 1955).
The result of thls overriding authority is a significant compromise
of the ideal model.

In that A may sanction B, C, or D without using

designated channels of A to B to C to D, likewise, B may exercise the
same option in regard to C and D, as illustrated in Figure II.
Bureau B, represented by the black bar, mayor may not maintain
the same relationship to bureaus C and D, depending upon the discretion
of A.
Bureaus C and D in this model

have the same informal and formal

authority and communication channel because of thelr placement within
the hierarchy.
The solid bar and arrows on the left of the figure represent
the actual or informal authority and communication channels that
bureau A has the option to exercise in an attempt to assure inter
bureaucratic compliance with normative standards.

This model illustrates

a violation of its counter-part, the ideal model, in that the powers of
subordinate bureaus are usurped hy bureau A by by-passing them in an
attempt to deal direetly with all leveLs of the bureaucracy.
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FIGURE II

A WORKING MODEL

Bureaucracy XY
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It should be noted that. this is an example of how one working
model may operate within Bureaucracy XY, and is not meant to be the
exclusive working model of the bureaucracy.

As circumstances and events

evolve within the bureaucracy, the working model also tends to adjust
to the changing situations.
Differential enforcement of normative standards (rules and regu
lations) is perhaps mos'i,: obvious within a single bureau because the super
visor is responsible for all operati::ms ydthin hb department and is
consequently reliant to some degree on the cooperation of his subordin
ates.The fact that he may occasionally yield to some of their collect
ive demands indicates that the group can exert some influence over
his decisions.

These concessions however, tend to furnish him with

discretionary sanctions and create social obligations wh:l.ch extend his
power and establish
As

his authority over every individual subordinate.

a result, his authority is validated through social interaction

which enables him to control his subordinates much more effectively
than they control him (Blau, 1955).
According to Blau (1955:214),when a new supervisor takes over a
department there is an initial period of leniency which allows the
supervisor to:
1.

Use subordinates' first names in order to foster cordial
relations.

2.

Never issue commands.

3.

Always make polite requests.

4.

Explain reasons for directions.

5.

Show willingness to rescind directives if subordinates
desire :It.

6.

Demonstrate willingnE:ss to help subordinates "get ahead."
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7.

Permit

oubordinat~s

to break minor rules.

The rationale of the above techniques is to create social obI i
gati.ons of subordinates to toe superV:l.80r.

Thus t toleration and

leniency toward exceptional or even illicit practices 't-lill actually
enhance the power of a supervisor, i.e. a rule
extends the discretionary power of the

tl~t

superviso~,

is regularly broken
because it furnishes

him with a base through which he can issue legitimate sanctions when he
sees fit.
By voluntarily relinquishing some of his prerogatives, the
supervisor created social obligations. His requests for co
operation when he could issue orders, his promises for future
help, his toleration of prohibited practices and spe:ial favors
for agents, his references to his identHication with them
and his conside-cate IDallner--all these serve to oblige.te his
subordinates to him (Blau, 1955:2J.5).
Ideally then, the supervisor:; appear to be somewhat altruistic
in their approaches to management, supportiug their subordinates when
ever possible, but in reality this support is manifested in the control
the supervisor gains over his subordinates by creating social and
personal obligations to himself.
Inter-Bureaucratic Distortion of Coals.

The formal public

function of all the activities within a bureaucratic hierarchy is the
achievement of goals.

Ideally, the organization is structured for the

"effective" accomplishment vf the purpose.

Simply speaking, bureau A

is primarily interested in controlling the bureaucracy in order to
achieve its goals to the greatest possible extent.
The head of bureau A (theoretically the most powerful individual
in the bureaucracy) oversees many policies; consequently he must
formulate each onc in broad general tErms, and does not have time to
work out the details.

The details, then

are left to subordinates to
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be. worked out.

Therefore, the orders of top-le\1'el management are 801

most always general in nature (Downs, 1966).
Top-level officials cannot review everything done by sub
ordinates 1n response to thefr orders. It might seem, there
fore, that they might review the most important responses, or
those likely to be executed badly. However, if their selection
for review can be easily fore.:ast, subordinates will have great
discretion regarding those orders that will not be reviewed.
This ~ill drastically reduce official control over the organi
zation (Tullock, 1965:186).
The meaning of the last passage is significant in that it S'l1g
gests the need to use coercive methods in order to gain compliance from
subordinates who would not otherwise comply with the orders given them.
The Weberian model posits that bureaucratic a.:tivity is both rational
and predictable because the source of authority is located in the
office as opposed to being located within the individuals who occupy
the office (Peabody, 1964).

This approach tends to ignore the moti

vations and attitudes of the humau beings working within the organization.
Anthony Downs (1966:135) in his work, Inside Bureaucracy, states
that:
There are very few orders so pre(!iGe and unequivocal that
they cannot be distorted by a factor cf 10%; consequently,
B's orders to his C level subordinates embody only 90% of what
A originally desired. C level will distort because its goals
will be dHferent, if only slightly, from A's aud B's. If
similar distortion occurs by the time A's orders get to D
level they will contain only 53% of A's original goals.
Downs terms this process "authority leakage" and suggests that
it is a common phenomenon when orders are passed down through levels
of a hierarchy, and that this leakage tends to become cumulative when
many levels are involved.

What, in reality happens, then, is that

administrators of bureau B believe that a aU.ght distortion of the order
can help him personally, or he may consciously or subconsciously distort
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orders so that his bureau T.vill be best benefited.
logically apply to bureaus C and D as well.

This concept . .·lould

A bureaucracy must contend

with not the smooth functioning of the ideal model, but the varying
personalities, abilities, attitudes, memories, images of goals, etc.!
of the individuals who occupy offices within the structure.

The

following is an adaptation of a mechanism Downs la.bels the "basic con
trol cycle. 1I
1.

An official issues a set of orders.

2.' He allows his subordinates time to put each order into
effect.
3.

He selects certain orders to evaluate his subordinates
performances.

4.

He seeks to discover what has actually been done at lower
levels as a result of the orders.

5.

He compares the effects of his orders with his original
intentions.

6.

Evaluates results of the order and selects appropriate action.

7.

If he elects to issue further orders as a result of his evalu
ation, the cycle starts again (Downs, 1966:144).
If the hierarchy functioned as the public formal model suggested,

actual control of the activities of the bureaucracy would be in the
hands of the top-leve.l management.

However, those offj.cials :Dust al

ways delegate some of their power to subordinates; hence the "rub," and
the need for anti-distortion devices to obtain compliance.

Individuals

within the organizational structure are subject to the attributes and
failings of humans, and consequently require monitoring, direction, coaching
and must be generally coerced into the proper performance.
Weber suggests that organizations, as problem solving mechanisms,
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depend upon factoring of the general goal into subgoals and these. subgoals into sub-subgoals and so on, until concr.ete routines are reached
(Thompson, 1961).

These subgoals are allocated to the organizational

units or departments and become their goals.
of the "order giving" process.

This pattern is indicative

That is, in passing orders downward,

subordinate bureaus must translate commands received into more specific
and expanded form.

As we have previously discussed, this ideal bureau

cratic function does not take into account the human element and as a
consequence a system of formal and informal sanctions and rewards has
been created to account for and motivate the human actors.
Bureaucracy in Perspective.

Bureaucrats, though publicly and

formally defending and supporting the Weberian model, have had to com
pensate for that model's inability tc cope with daily operationel func
tions by creating an informal "working" model.

This informal model may

vary from organization to organization, but one may say, with sorne
assurance, that it inevitably exists.
Of considerable importance is the latter model, in that it euforces
conformity, and threatens innovation at lower levels as deviancy, thereby
assuring a spirit of benign "status quoism."

As Downs (1966:50) posited:

While the tendency of administration may appear to be benign
and peaceful, as opposed to turbulence of conflict, it is actually
violent. It demands compliance; nothing less than compliance
will do; aud it must obtain compliance;, by persuasion or manage
ment if possible, by repression if necessary.
In essence, the nature of the mechanisms of the actual operation of
a bureaucracy are strongly coercive in demanding compliance to established
procedures, and in Downs' terms this "imposed order [compliance] is
vIolent."
1'his conc::;;pt is further amplified when one considers that the
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~.dministrc.tion

of a.

bure~ucracy

desirable element of society.

rej€.cts

the

concept of conflict a& a

The administration wants extremes ad

justed; it wants differences settled; and primarily, it wants to find
a set of procedures that it can use exclusively within the organization.
Whatever or whoever refuses to be adjusted is considered by supervisors
as a deviant, a departure from the norm,that must be treated and cured.
Consequently:
Discipline and control may inhibit initiative and creativ
ity on the part of subordinates. They may hesitate to assume
or' go out of their way to avoid responsibility. A worker
may tell his boss what he thinks his boss wants to hear.
Despite these potential inhibiting and disruptive consequences,
authority remains an inevitable aspect of complex organiza
tions (Peabody, 1964:10).
In sum, the system that is largely responsible for the adminis
tration of this country is treating procedure and knowledge as absolute,
and establishing mechanisms of control and operation to insure accpetance
by the actors within the orgalllzation.

With the advent and rapid adop

tion of technology and technological change in our society, it would
seem more appropriate to view knowledge and procedure as relative, as
opposed to absolute.

CHAPTER III

AN EMPIRICAL

~~~LE

IntroductioI:.
The intent of Chapter III is to present a description of an event
in the urban renewal process on che action agency level.

the selection of a park site, is treated in terms of

The event,

what" happened

II

in this section; while the analysis of the selection process will bc
discussed in Chapter IV.

Chapter III, then, illustrates an empirical

example of inter-bureau power relations as they are manifested in the
urban renewal process on the bureau level.

The relationship to tha

Weber ian model in a technical sense will be discussed in the subsequent
chapter.
Park Site Selection:

An Empirical Example

The McCannville Development Commission

(~IDC)

will be the bureau

discussed, and the selection of a park site in the Hayes District will
be the empirical example through which the above concepts will be
examined.
The selection of the park site in the Hayes Di.strict vas chosen
for analysis because:

(1) it affords an empirical example of the con

cepts of citizen participation; (2) it provides a link between inter
bureau and bureau relations; and (3) it further illustrates the working
and ideal type bureaucratic models.

(The term working model refers to

an empir.ical administrative structure composed of separate bureaus, or
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department':! "lithin bureaus,

~hat

rr..ay or may not conform to the estab

lished organizational structure.)
According to Department of Rousing and Urban Development (HUD)
regulations, the residents of the Hayes Distric.t would, through their
community association, assist tIle MOC in the planning, selection and
execution of a park site in their neighborhood.
citizen involvement in the
endorsement of a

Co~uission

act~al

But the extent

of

selection of a park site was the

developed and sponsored plan.

This is in

essence the thrust of this chapter.
The

Neighborhoo~

A broad view of the District which is the context for park site
selection can be briefly sketched as follows"
During the study, the Hayes District was primarily a residential
community covering about 360 acres

in the city's Northeastern section.

Of the 1,500 homes in the District, 95% were single family houses.
Although no detailed survey had been made as to the physical conditions
of the houses in the District, a "conservative" estimate would have
been about 30% in substandard conditions ~ half of whlch could be ccd1ed
dilapidated.
Tbere were about 35 businesses in the District, whose clientele
were

primari1ydra~~

from outside the district.

The few businesses that

serve mostly the Hayes District were, to a large extent, in substandard
buildings with no off-street parking.
Community facilities serving the District were:

one public

elementary school, three churches and an old fire house converted into
a youth centc:r.

Thera were no parks in the District itself.

There are approxima.tely 12 1/2 miIes of streets in the District;
about 1/2 were either unpaved or in substandard condition with only
a narrow paved strip down the middle of the right-of-way.
Of the residents, approximately 35% were black, 55% were 65 years
or older, and 75% made $5,000

a year or less.

1

In relation to the whole Northeastern section of the city the
Hayes District represen&s a fair approximation of the average neighbor
hood, it is not the most blighted area, nor ie: it the nlost prosperous.
When compared to overall McCannville residential standards, it was
easily a substandard neighborhood.
Background of the Park Sit.e
The initial idea of a park for the Hayes District

't.'ss

c.evelolJed

by the McCannville City Planning commissicn,2 the city agen~y respon
sible for long range comprehensive d.ty planning.

The }IDC "ras adv ised

of this plan, and agreed to incorporate the proposed park site in its
application to HUD for

Nf~ighborhocd

Del1elopment fundn.·3

\ofue'll the program

was approved by HUD, and the funds allocated, the Commission was committed
to developing a park in the Hayes District.
concerned~

As far as the par.k was

the Commission's goel became the coordination of the Hayes

District Community Association (HDGA) with the various city agencles

1. Taken from a document about the "Hayes District tl written by the
author while an employee of the Commission.

2. Commission docu~ent concerning citizen participation in the
"Hayes Dist.rict," September 11, 1970, p. 4.
3. The Neighborhcod Development Program is a federally funded
urban renewal progra.m to \Olhich the Commission applied and received funds
fer the administration oi.
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for the approval and eXecution of the park site porticn of the Neigh
borhood Development Program (NDP) plan.

The citizeu participation

staff of the MDC received the assignment of gaining citizen approval
for the Commission's planned park.

Since the park was included in the

first year's program, mID required that it be 80% completed by the end
of the "action" year.
30, 1971 .• )

(The action year was from July 1, 1970 to June

Thus, early resident approval of the park site was imper

ative.
Park Site Selection
The MDC set the HDCA approval date for the psrk site as the
15th of April, 1970.

In February, the director of citizen participation

for the MDC informally brought the park site topic to the attention of
the chairman of the HDCA.

After several informal discussions, the

chairman agreed to support a Commission planned park for the neighbor
hood.

With the support of the chairman, the director of citizen parti

cipation next secured the support of the

~xecutive

board of the HDCA.

This was accomplished over a period of approximately two weeks.
The first official public mentfon ofa park for the Hayes District
was in a general membership meeting,

Get:eral membership meetings of

the HDCA were open to all residents of the District.
the HDCA was held on March 10, 1970.

The meeting

of

The director of citizen parti

cipation for the Commission "requested that the executive board meet
with the Park Bureau and other appropriate agencies in order to determine
the location of the park."

(HDCA

Gen~ral

Membership Meeting, March 10,

1970) •
There was no action tak",n on this request at this meeting; hoW'e'Ter,
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t-he supposition that there would be a park in the Dj.stl'ict had been
introduced, made formal record of, and received no opposition.

On the

24th of March, the executive board of the RDCA had a regular meeting.
At this session, the director of citizen participation "asked" that a
special subcommittee of the HDCA be formed to "consider the location of
a park site and work with the Park Bureau, City Planning Commission,
HDC and other appropriate agencies ill developing the park."
Executive Board 1Unutes, March 24, 1970).

(BOCA

A subcommittee was fCirmad

called the Physical Planning COllWl:Lttec, made up of executive board
members of the HDCA.
It is important to note that: a. tentative park site locatfon had
been developed by the City Planning Commission in conjunction with the
MOC and other lIappropriate a.gencies," prior to any actual resident
involvement in the actual plenning.
At this meeting, a Mr. Thomas

1

was elected by the executive

board to be the HDCA's planning consultant.

Mr. Thomas was a resident

of the District and had been an active member of the HDCA since its
inception.

Mr. Thomas was also a registered architect.

after his election to his new post,

~~.

(Several days

Thomas was placed on the MOC

payroll as the planning consultant to the Hayes District.)

When asked

by the chairman of the BOCA to act as the consultant to the Physical
Planning Committee, he accepted.
On March 31, the Physical Planning Committee held its first
meeting.

1.

Attending this meeting were the seven executive board members

Fictitious name.

30
appoi~l1ted

to the committe€'

and nine MOe members.

After an election of

officers for the committee, Mr. Thomas incroduced the proposed park
site.

The nine MOG staff were there to primarily answer questiolls

about the park site design and location.

There was no opposition to the

proposed plan, Mr. Thomas "reported that with this map (;nap refers to a
map of the Hayes District) and the bu.dget information, he . . . o uld be
able to work out

3

recommendation to the committee as to the park for

the next meetlng. 1l

(HDCA Physical Planning Committee, March 31, 1970) •

.On April 6, the Physical Planning Committee approved the park
site.

This meeting was attended by five committee members and eight

MOC staff, including the executive director of the Commission.

The vote

to accept the pIau was unanimous.
Only one plan was presented t.o the committee, and only their approv
al of it was sought.

There was virtually no.::.i.then input in tht;:

design of the plan, nor was it sought, or asked for by the Commission.
April 14 was the date set for the general membership

me~ting

of

the HDCA in which formal, public accpetance of the park site was to
be attained.

Since the chairman, the

ex~cutive

board and the Physical

Planning Cornroittee of the Association were already committed to supporting
the plan, the Commission \Jas relatively confident of its approval
by the general membership.
Mr. Thomas introdu.ced the proposed p'3.rk site to over 100 res:!.dents

attending the meeting (8 record attendance for an lIDCA meeting), by
stati·ng that the bOUlldarie!:: of the park had been selected by the members
of the Physical Planning Committee (Physical Planning Committee, March
31, 1970) of the HDCA.

After his presentation of the site to the resi.dents,

the MOC staff attending che meeting were available to answer residents'
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questions.
The unexpected happene.dj small groups of the residents begao to
strongly oppose the plan.

It had become obvious to them that they were

not being asked to participate in planning or decision making, but to
approve an already existing plan.

The issue became either accepting the

plan, or not having a park in the neighborhood.

This put tr.emendous

pressure on the chairman and the executive board, not to mention the

HDC staff present.

The leadcr:}hip of EDt;A and th'3 technical nexpertise"

of the staff had been seriously challenged.
residents and the leadership of the
for well over an hour.

HDC~

The struggle between the

and the MOe staff continued

A staff member (an engineer) suggested that an

alternative plan be drawn up and presented at another meeting, thereby
offering the residents a choice.

As this became a motion and was being

voted on, the chairman of the Physical Planning Committee moved that the
plan presented be tentatively approved.

(This motion was made at the

personal and private request of the director of citizen participation
for the MOC.)
ship.

Both motions were passed by majority vote of the member

The next meeting of the HDCA genera!. mem:'ership was set for

April 20.
During the six days that ensued between the first and second
meetings, the original plan was designated by the Commission as Plan A,
(Figure III), while the alternate plan 1;-1aS to be kno'WIl. as Plan B,
(Figure IV).

PlanE

";&.5

of rather intereDting design in that it was

cut in half by one of the neighborhood's largest arterial thoroughfares,
wbich meant; (1) that the park would be a potential trap for children
playing on the fringes of the park near the road; or (2) that the road

F!GL'RE HI
.

THE HAYES DISTRICT
~IDG P8.rk Plan A

32

FIGrRE IV
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itself 'Would be. closed, thereby ci.ivcrt:.ing the thru traffic. into the
resident:i.al sr.reets around the park.

The Ccmmi::;sion decid.ed it would

be best to close the street.
Prior to the April 20 meeting of the HDCA, the citizen partici
pation staff was able to reaffirm thp. sllpport of the c.hairm.an, the
executive board, and the Physical Planning Committee.
At the April 20 general membership meeting,
both Plan A and Plan B to the residents.

y~.

TIlomas presented

But now the issue had become

whether to choose Plan A or Plan B, and not whether or not to have a
park in the District.

The residents, with very little staff assistance,

decided that Plan A was superior to Plan B, and passed it by a majority
vote.
In sum, the MDC was able, through the use of what I have identified
as a working model, to achieve its goal, the selection and approval of
a park site by the residents of the Hayes District, thus satisfying
the

~equirement

for citizen participation in the planning and develop

ment of community projects.

In attaining resident approval for the park,

the Commission used both implicit and explicit coercion; it largely
distorted the goal of citizen participation as outlined by HUD, and it
differentially enforced not only HUD regulations but its own regulations
as well.

An

~nformal

working model of citizen participation was devel

oped in order to facilitate greater
residents.

passa~e

of the park site by the

The director of citizen participation, with the aid of an

assistant, the

autho~,

successfully and informally contacted and

received the support of the chairman of ehe HDCA, the Executive Board,
and the Physical Planning Committee, prior to any formal meeting of
the lIDCA or any of its subcomm1.ttees.

The informal model continued in

35

operation until final passage of the site by the general membership of
the lIDCA.

Thus, in the selection of a park site in the Hayes District,

both real and ideal models of citizen participation were illustLated
as well as the concepts of coercion, distortion of goals and the differ
ential

~nforcement

of rules and regulations.

CRAPTER IV
FINDINGS:

A WOt'king Model:

Ail

IDEAL AND WORKING MODELS

Urban Renev,al Agency

In the selection of a working model to illustrate the theoretical
concepts of this paper, an urban rer.ew&l bureaucracy was ch.Jsell.
reasons for this choice were;

T!le

(1) the nature of a federal non-profit

organization seemed amenable to this kind of study; (2) the public
"accountability" (public accountability is that aspect of control,
both overt and covert, that a society maintains over institutions
accountable to it to furnish explanations for its activities) of a
federal bureaucracy; and (3) the

autho~f~

nine month participaut

observation experience ·lI1ithin an agency of the bureaucracy.
With these points in mind, lv-e will initially examine the action
agency itself, before presenting an overview of the whole bureaucratic
system.

I have chosen to call this action agency the McCannville

Development Commission (MDC), as opposed to using its real name, for
my purposes here are academic.

That is, the primary interest of this

study is the examination of some of the operational functions of a
complex organization, and is not intended to be material for an expose.
Likewise, the city that supports the Commission will be known as
McCannville.

This city is located on the West coast and has a population

of a half million, of which 50,000 are minority group members (non
whitp.s, primarily blacks).
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The McCannvi1le Development CO'CllUissioll is responsible fer all urban
renewal activities in the city; however, due largely to the availability
of federal funds for urban renewal in black districts, many of the Com
mission efforts are focused in the black inhabited Northeastern section
~vith

in subsequent pages).

McCan~ville

voters through a city

of the city, (a topic to be dealt
mission was established by

The Com
charte~

amendment in 1958, and charged with the following:
• the Department of D",ve1opmE:i.i.t and Cbric Prc::lctic::. I!:
is responsible for HcCannvi11e's urban renewal programs and
assists in the promotion of commercial and industrial develop
ment. One of the Commission~smajor objectives has been to blend
citizen participation ~\7ith the roles of local, state and federal
agencies in the planning and development of its projects.
(Taken from the actual Urban Renewal Commission's definition
of its role in the cOlT.'.munity, published in mimeograph form.)
Simply then, the MOe is responsible to the City Council of McCann
ville for the city's urban renet.1al, with a pledged emphasis on citizens'
participation.

To carry out this goal, the Commission was organized

with a single chairman at its head, four commissione.rs and an executive
director with a staff of approximately sixty to administer its various
programs.

The formal organization and power structure are illustrated

in Figure V.

It closely follows the Weber ian ideal model, in that it

is headed by a c:18.irman who wields ult:imate power and authority, support
ed by four commissioners subordinate to him, but superordinate to the
administrative staff:

an executive director subordinate to the chairman

and the commissioners, but superordinate to his staff, etc.

Lines of

formal communication generally follow the vertical lines of authority,
i.e. the submission of monthly activities reports initiated in a field
office will follow the vertical channels of authority as illustrated in
Figure V.

It is iwpoltant to note that most formal activities (those of

FIGURE V
THE IDEAL MODEL
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of a rOt4tine nature), generally follow the public ideal model.

When

an activi.ty or decisioll does .!!£.t require a policy type decision, the
public model is followed.

The reason for the presentatioll of the Weber

ian like ideal model, to the public and the staff itself, appears to
be the legal requirement of public accountability of the Commission.
The nature of urban rene"al activities in a comnlll:nity
diture of federal funds place

and the expen

the Commission under the scrutiny of

monitori:ng agencies of all kinds, the mQss media, groups gnd clubs
of every description, as well as private citizens.

Therefore, whenever

possible, the Commission presents itself as the ideal model bureau that
is run by rational, logical design, with an expert technical staff,
maximum citizen input, and an equalitarian chain of command.

Figure V

then represents the formal public organization of the Commission's
hierarchical structure.
Figure VI illustrates the actual working model when other than
routine matters are at issue, i.e. policy making, press releases
(other than routine), hiring and firing of staff, special problems,
etc.

While activities carried out under the formal model are carefully

documented and tlfiled" as a matter of public record, meetings of the
working model tend to be informal and unrecorded, thus the working model
exists in

quas~-secret

necessitated by:

form.

This modification of the ideal model is

(1) a need to by-pass channels when a time element is

involved; (2) the ineptitude of certain staff members :I.n critical posi
tions; (3) the generally clumsy nature of the ideal model; and (4) the
unique positi0n and personal capabilities of the five members of the
working model to actually run the Comm;,ssion somewhat compete.ntly.

FIGURE VI
THE WORKING MODEL
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within the Commission.
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The point is that the
first is a formal public

Co~uission

pres~ntt,tion

maintains twv hierarchies.

The

of the agency which is similar

to the I<1eberian model Qf a rational mOll'.)lith, with relationships of
super and subordination, supported by expert technical staffs.
reason for this phenomenPnis largely

du~

the Commission and the consequent need to

The

to the public accountability of
d~monst:rate

its !'ati.onc:.l,

professional, equalitarian nature, hence the adoption of the \veberinn
mod~l.

TIle

~econJ

is the

wo~king

model, made up of those elemeuts with

in the agency that actually wield decision making power.
Organizational Structure of the Urban Renewal Bureaucracy
The organizational structure of the urban renewal bureaucracy is
in itself relatively simple.

It, like the action agency, adheres to

a Weberian like public model while often working through a modification
of that model in attaining its goals.

The ideal, or public model, may

be defined as rigid, rational and formal organization with highly defined
authority and communication channels, with the amount of power regulated
oy the position of the office within the hierarchy of the bureaucracy.
Theoretically, each bureau has its defined jurisdictional area arranged
vertically in a Weberian styled ideal hierarchy.

That is, each bureau

has its areas of responsibility, power, and control in relationship
to the bureaucracy as a whole.
The controlling agency of this bureaucracy is the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which "governs" its subordinate
bureaus through a system of rules, laws and regulations, and the allo
cation of federal funds.

Thus, the administrators of HUD or bureau A,

maintain their superior position as the head bureau with overriding

A

4Z
authority over their subordinate bureaus.

Though each of the subor

di.nate bureaus is obligated to follow HUn's dictums, they in turn may
require a subordinate bureau to follow rules andior regulations tnaL they
may design.

The administrators of bureau C, in other words, may be

required to follow both A's and B's regulations (with A's regulations
having priority), create further regulations for :I.ts own jurisdictior.al
area and add still more requi.rements on to the a.c.tion agency, bureau D,
thus D must follow thE" regulati-oTls of As B, and C•
.Though RUD maintains several hundred. action agencies, and several
regional offices throughout the country, this study will focus on a
model that is indicative of the bureaucracy, but limited to one regional
office and one actiol1 agency (see Figure V1I.).
This model, like the action agency's ideal model, is widely pub
licized and adhered to for most routine administrative activities-
for the same reason, public accoul1tabllity.

HUD, and the entire urban

renewal bureaucracy, including this model, is being continually examined,
probed, investigated and ,monitored, by Congress, the mass media, inter
est and pressure groups, revolutionaries of all types, millority groups of
every description, etc.

A Weberian like model provides a structure for

a maximization of accountability through rationalized administration,
:in that each bureau is responsible for its jurisdictional area with
ultimate responsibility and authority at the top, the head bureau.
The ideal model represents the organization of public record, like
the action agency, the formal rules and regulations; the accounts of
bureaucratic activities; the dispensing and withdrawing of funds from
a program or project all follow this model.

1;3

FIGURE VII
THE URBAN RENEv,'AL BUREAUCRACY:

A.

IDEAL MODEL

Department of Housing and Urban Development:

Al. Department of Housing and Urban Development:
San Francisco, California.
B.

City Council:

C.

Model Cities Citizen Planning Board:

D.

McCannville Development Commission.

Washington, D. C.
Regional Office,

NcCannville.
McCannville.
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However well designad, the ideal type bureaucracy often requires
modification in light of:

(1) fortuitous events; (2) time limitations;

(3) personnel weakne'sses in critical positions within the bureaucracy;
or (4) bureaucratic "red-tape."

As a result, the most common m,odifi·

cation of the ideal bureaucracy is illustrated in Figure VIII.
The solid arrows represent lines of authority on a superordinate
basis--while the broken arrows illustrate channels of communication.
This figure demonstrates the rigidity of the ideal model. in t:hat lines
of authority and communication are arranged in terms of Weber's ideal
model.
This model is most often used when there is a time limitatior.
involved that precludes the use of the ideal model.

An empirical

/

eXl"~ple

of the use of the working model involved the sudden availability of
$100,000 that needed to be dispensed to an action agency within (appar
ently) several hours.

When the MDC was selectee! as a candidate for

these funds, it was notified by telephone from the HOO offices in
Washington, D. C., and given several hours to reply via the sa'lle media.
The working model of the action agency {see Figure V) responded by hold
ing an immediate conference, and a decigion was made to accept the
$100,000.

The total time element !nvolved from the initial receipt of

the HUD notification of the

~unds,

to acceptance. to

HL~

confirmation

of the additional funds, was approximately two and cne half hours.
The next day the staff of the

MDe was verbally notified of the grant,

but was warned that it was st:i1l a
consumption.

~~,

and not yet ready for public

In the meantime, as per HUD rp.quest, the MDC prepared a

formal application for the additional $100,000 to tlsupplement" the already
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FIGURE VIII
AN URBAN RENEWAL BUREAUCRACY:

AN EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE

A.

Department of Housing and Urban Development:

Washington, D. C.

Al.

Department of Housing and Urban Development:
San Francisco, California.

Regional Office,

B.

City Council:

C.

Model Cities Citizens Planning Board:

D.

McCannville Development Commission

McCannville
McCannville

This figure demonstrRtes a modification of the ideal public
model. It is important to note that the modification is not an ex
clusive one, noT. is It permanent, and that the public model is always
in some form of operation. This particuls.r modification illustrates
HUD by-passing bureaus,Al,B and C, dealing directly with the action
agency, the McCannville Development COllllllission.
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epproved and funded Neighborhood Development
administration of the :HDC.

Progcam unde.r the current

This application containe.d all the support

ing data explaining the need for the additional funds.

Once the appli

cation was approved by bureaus Band C, a senator from the state made
a personal radio announcement of the additional $100,000 granted to the
McCannvi1le Development Commission for urbcm rene'-la1.

No formal records

were kept of the telephone conversations or agreements, only file copies
of the formal application.

This type

the results were fruitful in that:

or

activity was .lOt unco::nmcn, and

(1) the modi.fication of the ideal

model met the time requirement; (2) public accountability was met by
filing a formal application through channels before H was pub1icl¥
announced; and (3) a senator was able to make some "political hay" by
announcing the "award II of the additional funds to the :Neighborhood
Development Program.
It is through the unrecorded modification of the ideal model that

many critical decisions are made that affect the entire bureaucracy and
urban renewal.

However, it is normally the ideal formal model that

comes under the public's scrutiny and comment.
The existence and the use of working ntode1s wi thin the bureau
cracy is a classic example of the differential enforcement of rules and
regulations by the head bureau.

Normative standards established by the

administrators of HUD require that the designated channels of the ideal
public model be used for reasons of public accountability, failure to
comply with this standard without the expH.cit approval nf HUD may mean
actual loss of funds for existing or future programs.

HUD,however

reta:f.ns !Jverriding authority of the:.:stab1ished bureaucratic mec!1anisms

and may si.gnifi.eantly compromise the ideal model in the attainmer.t of
its goals.

As demonstrated in the empir:.i.cal example, HUD by-passed

bureaus A,B, and C and chose to deal directly with bureau D.

Bureaus

subordinate to HU'.J l:tkewise maintain working models aI!d use them in
appropriate situations.

The "appropriateness" of the use of the

working model is largely determined by

nL~.

normative standards allows HUD to control its

The existence of the
subordiI~te

bureaus through

the exercise of its sanctioning power.
Bureaucrats and Residents
Maximization of citizen participation in the urban renewal process
is a goal of the bureaucracy.

It will be through the concept of citi

zen participation that the theoretical concepts of this paper will be
further examined.
HUD has issued several directives pertaining to the role of citi
zens.' participation on the action agency level (HUD RHA 7100.1).

The

following are two abstracts taken from those directives.
Requirements for Citizen Involvement. A guiding principle
of Departmental policy is to insure that citizens have the
opportunity to participate in policies and programs which affect
their welfare. Therefore, the workable program requires clear
evidence that the commur.ity provides opportunities for citizens,
including those who are poor and members of minority groups,
to participate in all Hun assisted programs • • • The community
will also .be expected to show \o!hat progress has been made during
each certification period to achieve an adequate and effective
degree of citizen involvement.
A more explicit statement appear.ed in a similar document of later
publication (HUD RHA 7217.1);
It is HL~ policy to assure that maximum opportunities are
provided for citizen involvement in the planning, develop
m.ent and execution of programs assisted by the Department.
Citizens should have clear and direct access to decision
making in all stages of the 'lrban renewal process.
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These statements represent HUD' s basic public positj.on on citizen
participation.

When transmit:ted through the bureaucracy to the action

agency. the policy becomes a requjrement and a continual goal to be
achieved over a period of time.

HUD,however, leaves the choice of

mechanism for the exel:cise of citizec partic:lpation to the local com
munity and the structure of the part.icu1ar agency.
To the action agency, then, the requirement for citizen partici
pation in its programs becomes a part of its overall operation.

In the

case of the MDC, a separate staff section was designed to manage,
report, organize and direct citizen participation as it related to Com
mission projects.

During the period of this study, the citizen partici

pation staff was the largest department in the agency with more than
seventeen members.
HOD's requirement is relatively simple; citizens of t:he com
munities involved in HUD sponsored pcograms

will participate in the

planning, development and execution of those programs.

TIle mechanism(s)

through which this process occurs is largely left up to the action
agency, but HUD requires that some sort of measurement of citizen parti
cipation be reported and
improving.

tr~t

the process be continually expanding and

The coercive nature of this program is manifested through

HUD's ability to deny or grant federal funds to action agencies.

If

the residents of a project area complain too bitterly about the action
aganc~.fs

tactics, programs and staffs involved in citizen participation,

the action agency is given opportunit.ies to defend itself, but i f the
negative pressure on the part of the residents continues the agency
stands a chance of not b,e.i.ng funded for that particular project the

following year, or having the funds siffiply withJrawn.

~fuat

the

Hu~

citizen participation policy has come to mean on the action agency level
in essence is, citizens need to be uneutra1izedu through the partici
pation process so that public dissention and opposit:f.on to urban renewal
projects may be m.inimized.

A;::tion agencies receive no additional awards

of funds for citizen participation, but stand to lose greatly from
citizen opposition,

no~

only locally through civic and court actions

and an unpopular press, but may
from HUD.
MOC.

b~

denied funds for their p:=ojects

Denial of federal funds would mean all but closure to the

Though HUD requires citizen participation, it has developed no

monitoring system for it, and seems to have little interest in it out
side of a monthly nwnerical account of it, unless there are opposition
and citizen complaints.
until residents publicly

HUD will tolerate distortion of this goal,
demonstrate dissatisfaction; then it retains

the right to sanction the action agency involved.
Citizen participation is not in itself a genuine process, but a
constraining mechanism which this bureaucracy must contend with in
achieving its goals.
The lesson for the community organization is plain: the
function of citizen participation is to support, not to
create. TIle function of the professional is to create
(Kramer and Specht, 1969:57).
The }IDC views citizen participation as still another obstacle in
the process of urban renewal.

It, at the same time, realizes the

essence (as previously discussed) of the HUD requirement and submits
month;Ly reports of citizens' participation in its various projects.
To the Cowmission, the idea of ordinary citizens actually taking
part in complex planning, design and execution of complex urban renewal

projecta seems much beyond the capabilicies of any citizenry.
Such people are usually the objects of civic action; they
are acted upon by others. but rarely do they themselves in
itiate action. As a result they often develop a keen sense
of the difference bety1een I!y'!e" and !!theyll--"they'! betng out
side, city-wide civic and political forces which seek to
police them, vote them, and redevelop them (Spiegel, 1968:

51).
Basically citizen pal'ticipation for the "average" citizen in the
project areas is beyond his means of experience in organized endeavors
of this nature, and in excess of hil:3 time available
activity.

1

iOJ::

this kind of

It is a relatively easy process to obtain consent to re

newal plans when people are thinking in terms of general goals and
community-wide benefits, but it hes proven much more difficult when the
same people are shown the same set of facts in terms of personal threats
and costs.

As a consequence, through HUD sanction, the MOe, and most

other action agencies, have chosen to work through neighborhood organi
zations representing the project areas involved.

Thus, programs and

projects are sold to the residents on a broad good-for-the-commonwealth
basis.
Ideally, the concept of citizens' participation recognizes the
vested interests and concerns of the residents involved in the projects
themselves, and as such, places some part of the power to shape or
respond to su;!h programs in their hands (Spiegel, 1968).
rarely becomes the real.

But: the ideal

The complexity 6f the factors involved in urban

1. Through the participant-observation experience,I learned
that a majority of the population of the Hayes District shared little
interest in the concept of citizen participation, unless the fate of
their o.. .m personal property ,-.;;as involved.
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planning require the combined skills of city planning specialists)
engineers, architects, relocation staffs, finance experts, etc"

but Con

gress, with the advent of the anti-poverty program, haa required admir.
istrative agencies spending federal funds to maintain active programs
of citizen participation.
req~iring

HUD

l~s

responded by developing a policy

cit!=en participation on the action agency level, but leaving

the mechanism for it largely up to the action agency itself.

The result

has been the formal accounting of citizen participation through re
ports submitted to HUD on some type of regular basis, usually monthly.
In order to better facilitate the administrative mechanisms of HUD,
the citizen participation data (whic.h is in reality largely subjective)
is translated into numbers and given the required simulacrum of object
ivity.
The MDC has translated the citizen participation concept into
terms of citizen neutralization as previ.ously stated.

Public, com

munity confirmation and sanction of Commission urban renewal plans,
is a useful mechanism in quelling the opposition of individual residents
within the neighborhood and keeping publicity about its activities
favorable.
The Role of the Community Association in Relation to Achieving Bureau
cratic Goals
In an attempt to deal with the potentially unwieldly and chaotic
process of citizen participation, HUD early in 1969 developed the
concept of a Project Area Committee.
A Project Area Committee (PAC) made up of residents of a
project area, shall be established for each urban renewal
project ill which residential , • • activities are contempla
ted • • • The (action agency) shall work closely with the
PAC to assure that project residents participate ill the form
ulation and execution of plans fOl: ranewal of the area and
improvement of the condition of its residents (HUD RHA 721i .5).

In essence, thie 'vas a tremendous assist tc the action agencies.
It, for all practical purposes, meant the end of dealing with individual
residents on matters of citizen participation, as they were now refer
red to their PAC.

At this point the }IDC was able to deal with one organ

ization per project area, which greatly simplified its task.

Regular

meetings were established, chairman and executive board members elected
by local residents, and the Commission retained tight control.
The MOC organized the first PAC in McCannville and literally pre
pared the agendas for the meetings, typed the minutes, provided the meet
ing places and served refreshments.

The records of the PAC's meetings

were (and still are) kept in the MOC files.

Citizen participation in

McCannville was under tne tight control of the MOC.'
It did not take long,however, for at least some residents of the
communities involved to sense that this process of participation was
not all genuine, and low-keyed opposition began to be heard.

At this

point the citizen participation staff of the MDC realized that future
PAC sanctio'[)'s of MOC urban renewal programs might be jeopardized, and
as a consequence two adjustments were made:

(1) the manipulation of

the appearance of power; and (2) the development of options to simulate
choice.
First, the Commission realizE',c:. tl:.iat

.:IS

long as the residents felt

controlled by MDe, there would be reasonable grounds for opposition to
its programs.

As a result the Commission began to play only a minor

role in public PAC meetings, anSWering an occasional technical questioIl,
serving refreshments, handing out agendas, and so on.

Nothing really

changed, only the manipulation of the appearance of power to the chair
man of the PAC and their executive boards.

Hence, the Commission
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monopolized on the fact that the source of power most easily manipulated
is the sense of leadership in organized groups (Kramer and Specht,
1969:52).
the

The chairman and h::f.s execm:ive board would always meet with

Co~~ission

staff several days prior to the public general meeting.

It is at these meetings that the Commission let its desires and needs
be known.

Opposition and problems aLe resolved at this level before

the general membership ever becomes involved.

In nearly all cases

involving the Hayes District Community Association the decisions are
made to support the Commission program prior to the general membership
meeting.

It is at this level that whatever compromises are required are

made, so that at regular public meetings of the Project Area Committee
(PAC), the Commission is sure of support from the ohairman and the
executive board.
Figure IX represents a sequential list of meetings, their topics,
and the ratio of MDC staff to HDCA members.

It is important to note the

attendance of MDC staff to HDCA meetings fluctuated with the nature and
purpose of the meeting--the more critical the meeting in relation to
MOC programldng the more staff present.
A ratio of nearly one to one of staff to members, when a critical
decision was to be made, leaves little doubt as to the nature of citizen
participation in McCannville.

The following quotation is not a universal

truth, but it is indicative of the situation:
Sometimes when the cmmnunity begi.ns to ask hard or embar
rassing questiocs, profession.ds retire beneath a msntle of
experience and qualif:!,,:ations to d~mand that their judgments
be accepted as revealec truth; administ,ators retre3t behind
a slIioke screen of procedural objectives (Spiegel, 1965~67).

FIGURE IX

HDCA MEETINGS - MAY 2, 1969 TO APRIL 20, 1969
5/2/69

Type:
Purpose:
Ratio:

11/16/69

Type:
Purpose:
Ratio:

11/19/69

Type:
Purpose:
Ratio:

12/9/69

Type;
Purpose:
Ratio:

1/7/70

Type:
Purpose:
Ratio:

1/13/70

Type:
Purpose:
Ratio:

1/27/70

Type:
Purpose:
Ratio:

2/10/70

Type;
Purpose:
Ratio:

Executive Board
MOC Introduces Nei.ghborhood Devel
opment Program to Executive Board
(Nonpolicy Making)
2 MDC Staff - J.O MeJTIbers (l: 5)
General Membership
Election of Officers (Nonpolicy
Making)
2 MDC Staff - 27 Members (1:3.5)
General Membership
Introduction of Neighborhood Devel
opment Program's Financial Aid
Program (Noncritical Policy l<Iaking)
4 MOC Staff - 20 Members (1:5)
Exec.utive Board
Budget for Citizens' Participation
(Policy Making)
3 MOC Staff - 10 Members (1:3.3)
Executive Board
Acceptance of NDP Proposal (Critical
Polky Making)
12 MDC Staff - 9 Members (1:.75)
General Membership
Orientation to NDP by Staff (Policy
Making)
8 MDC Staff - 20 Members (1:2.5)
Executive Board
NDP Proposal and Changes (Policy
Making)
6 MDC Staff - 13 Members (1:2.1)
General Membership
Financial Assistance Program under
~~P (Noncritical)
9 MOe Staff - 33 Members (1:3.7)
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FIGURE IX
2/16/70

~ontinued

• • •

Type:
Purpose:
Ratio:

3/10/70

Type:
Purpose:
Ratio:

3/31/70

Type:
Purpose:
Ratio:

4/5/70

Type:
Purpose:
Ratio:

4/14/70

Membership
Introduction of Park Site Concept
(Noncridcal)
10 MDC Staff - 24 Members (1:2.4)
Ge~eral

Physical Planning Commltto::e
Park Site Location (Critical Policy
Making)
7 MDC Staff - 5 Members (1:1.4)
Physical Planning Committee
Park Site Plan Approval (Critical
Policy)
8 MDC Staff - 5 Members (1:.72)

Ratio:

General Member.ship
Park Site Approval (Noncrit:f.cal
Policy)
9 MOC Staff - 102 Members (1:12.7)

Type:
Purpose:
Ratio:

General Membership
Park Site Approval (Noncritical Policy)
9 MOC Staff - 115 Members (1:12.4)

Type~

Purpose:

4/20/70

"Executive Board
Fimll Approvel of :mp Proposal
(Critical Policy Making)
6 }ID~ Staff - 10 Members (1:1.6)
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The critical

qucstio~

seems to be whether or not the conditions

necessary for successful citizen engagement in urban renewal are toler
able to the administrative, political and professional establishment
in whose hands the initiation of such activities lies.

For citizen

participation is a social i.nvention developed outside of the llrban
renewal bureaucracy and merely Rftxed to it.

The concept of ordin

ary citizens takj.ng part in impl.'oving the community is ccrtainly in
keeping with the .\mcrican ideal of democracy.

O~e

finds little fault

with the concept of citizen participation, but its practical application
to urban renewal 8.ctivities had certainly fallen short of any original
expectations (in reality).

Simply, federally sponsored urban renewal

projects require deaH.ng successfully with almost endless amounts of
red tape.

It has taken a long time for action agencies, model cities

administrators and city governments to acquire the knowledge and exper
ience required for this.

Any expectations that citizens of a given

urban renewal project have the time, interest and skills required for
meaningful participation falls in the realm of the ideal.
Although HUD requires citizens' participation on the part of its
agencies it has also demanded, in the case of the MDC, that eighty percent

(80%) of the work be completed in the first year's proposal in.the
Neighborhood
be allocated.

D~velopment

Program, or the second year's funds would not

The impact of this requirement was to almost totally

nullify all but token citizen participation in the Hayes District, for
it put the Commission on a rigid time schedule for the accomplishment
of certain tasks.
Figure X is a timetable established by the :toIDC for the addition
of t ..10 lots to the park site in the Hayes Distri.ct.
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FIGURE X
PROPOSED

TIMET}~LE

FOR PROCESSING THE HAYEP DISTRICT

URBAN RENEWAL PLAN SUPPLEMENT'

Purpose of Supplement:

Addition of two lots to Park at Corner of

Claremont and Oneonta.

July 21

Approval of Hayes District Community Associatior.' s
Physical Environment Commtttee.

July 28

Approval of HDCA Executive Committee.

August 4

Verbal contact, by telephone, with city agencies asking
approval.

August 7-11

Draft supplement.

August 12

Itail copies of urban renewal supplement to HUD, Model
Cities Citizen Planning Board. consultants and the
president of the HDCA.

August 14

Receive written agreements from city agencies.

August 17

MDC resolutions approving supplements.

August 19

Meeting of the HDCA general membership to approve addition
to park.

August 21

Mail copies of supplement to Model Cities Special Projects
Committee.

August 26

Approval of Special Projects Committee.

September 1

Receive HUD approval of supplement.

September 1

Approval of city council.

September 1

Approval of Model Cities Citizens Planning Board.

1. Taken from the actual Commission's timetable fer the Hayes
District.

58

The HUD requirement for eighty percent (80%) proje::ct completion
of the first yea-r's program or no funds for the second year is coercion.
For the MDC, the Neighborhood Development Program provides approximatdy
seventy-five percent (75%) of its operating funds.
participation becomes citizen

neutrali~ation

may be completed alld the time schedule met.

Consequently, citizen

so that the necessary work
Seventeen full-time Com

mission staff are assigned to insure the success of this process.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
tfuat lIas Been Discussed:

A Brief SUIlllTlary

A Weber like ideal type bureaucracy has become the public
fo~

an urban renewal b:::rcaucr:lcy.

~)del

The Webcrian style Model 8.ffords

maximum public accountability while maintaining a rational, logical
structure of inter-bureau relationships.

presented

The publicly

image of tbe urban renewal bureaucracy is one of a smoothly and effi
ciently functioning organization based upon equalj_tarian principles.
nlis image is se critical to the overall public perspective of the
bureaucracy that the administration of it carefully records and docu
ments the functioning of the Weber ian model.

What We.ber intended to

be an ideal type description of bureaucracy has manifested itself in
the urban renewal bureaucracy as an ideology.
ideal type model has become the publicly

For the Weberian l.ike

presented image of the

bureaucracy, and as such is related to the American political concept
of a democratically run institution.
the political

~spects

1~e

ideal model

satisfies

of the federally run institution in relation to

public accountability, while the working models tend to be actually
responsible for carrying ou.t the urban renewal processes.

Because of

the ideologic nature of the ideal model, records of its operation are
carefully

rr~intained

ment to it.

in order to demonstrate the bureaucracy's commit

No records tend to be kept of the activities of the working

models because of the obvious contradictions to the ideal model; therefore,
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working models tend to be quasi-secret in nature.

Thus, whatever

information is gained from or about the urban renewal bureaucracy is
usually in keeping with the functioning of the ideal model.
Citizen participation was affixed to the ideal model by the Con
gress of the United States.

The concept of citizen particil,)ation would

logically secm to be an extention of the ideology attached to the ideal
model.

That is, an enlightened citizenry assisting a democratically

run bureaucracy was ·.ric'tved '!:Iy Congress as l'Jgical and desirable.
The bureaucracy responded by formally incorporating citizen
participation into the functioning processes of its ideal model.

How

the ideal and working models of an a.ction agency dealt with citizen
participation was the essence of this thesis.
During a nine month participant-observation study of an action
agency, the "'MDC," the author became aware of the models operating with
in the ideal public model.

These "other" models were designated real or

working models, and it was noted that they tended to exist on both inter
bureau and bureau levels.

These working models seemed to have more

power in the actual administration of urban renewal activities than the
ideal model.

Working models co-exist with the ideal type, but because

of their contradictory nature in relation to the ideal model, their
activities tend to be unrecorded.
Whereas, the operation of the ideal type model is theoretically
based upon concepts like cooperation, equalitarian principles, and
adherence to an established hierarchy of authority, the working model
seems to function on concepts like coercion, differential enforcement
of rules and r.egulations, and the

dis~ortion

of goals.

It is important

to note that the function of both real and ideal models is to achieve
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the formal goalG cf the bureeucracy.
Chapters three and four illustrate

th~

concepts of real and

ideal models on inter-bureau and bureau levels respectively.

The

concept of ci then partic:i.pation as a requirement in the urban renewal
process on both levels provided a

fOCUf:

for the demonstration of both

real and ideal modc!s.
Some Lessons Learned
What essentially happens in the urban renewal bureaucracy is that
the administration views its goals in terms of the overall society;
consequently the importance of the "end results!! seems to have precedence
over how they are accomplished; i.e. if the pervasive society is sup
portive of the ideal model and its goals, the urban renewal bureaucracy
reports its activities in those terms--regard1ess if it functions in
those terms or not.
The result of these phenomcna, in terms of the cffect on those
individuals subject to the urban renewal process, are considerably con
sequential in that they are further removed from realizing any "voice"
in the urban renewal process in their neighborhood.

The resident is nearly

totally "neutralized u by the concept of citizens' participation itself.
He is officially required to use the mechanism of the Project Area
Committee, i.e. the HDCA, to voice his opinion on policy and decision
making.

The existence of MDC established citizen participation mechan

isms tend also to mean MDC control over its activities; the resident
then, is forced to deal with an exclusive mechanism for the exercise
of his "right" to participate in the urban renewal process.

The resi

dents tcnd to be !teo-opted" by an organization that "1as formally

established to insure their. active participation in the urban renewal
process.

Thus, if a resident w'ants to oppose an }fDC plan or program

he must do so through the Project Area Committee, which, as has been
illustrated, is largely contro11>:!d by the l1!JC.

If the re::lident wishes

to carryon his oppositicn, it will b~ in terms of opposing his neighbors'
approved programs and plans, for the

MOe uses the project area committees

to gain public neighborhood COllsent and approval for its programs.

Thus,

the resident is faced with opposing his fl'lends and neighbors instead
of the Commission.
Although the study of real and ideal bureaucratic models is
not new to sociology, the study of them in relation to particular
bureaucracies can make additions to the understanding of them.

The

complexity of our society may be mirrored in the complexity of our
bureaurcracies, and efforts to further the understanding 'Will hopefully
be beneficial to the society.
In addition to gaining general understandings of the functioning
of a bureaucracy and how that functioning affects those parts of society
that it comes in contact with, specific knowledge of working and ideal
models may advance the ability of individuals who must deal with bureau
cracies on the level discussed in this thesis to cope with them.

With

an understanding of the existence of working and ideal models, citizen
groups, such as the HDCA, might be made sophisticated, more knowledge
able, and perhaps even more powerful in taking part in the actual urban
renewal process.
pleads guilty.

If these thoughts seem a bit idealistic, the author
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Thoughts for

Fu~ure

Stud):

This thesis :Ulumilla tes the nee.d for future study :1.n the operation
of working and ideal models in complex organizations.

The imj,llicationa

of their existence and operation in the urban renewal bureaucracy
raises the question of the extent of theiT universality in other complex
organizations, and of the extent that the organizationts Itclient tt may
or may not be subject to the operation of both v:orking and real models.
With the ad'1ent of stete revenue sharing, the speculation that citj.
zen participation would be even further diluted, is not an unreasonable
forecast.

For whatever

cursory control that the administrators of HUD

maintained over the action agency in the realm of citizen participation
would be given up to individual states, and consequently to t::te cities
carrying out urban renewal projects within the state, a

probable result

being the concept of city-wide citizen participation) regulated by the
action agency T3ther tl~n citizen participation in each project area.
Consequently, in the city-wide race and competition for available funds,
the best ot"ganized, influential, powerful, and politically adept
groups would undoubtedly receive preferential treatment, leaving those
groups with little organization and resources with little hope of
assistance.
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